Abstract. Implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), including hardware applications with limited resources (e.g., smart cards), may be vulnerable to "side-channel attacks" such as differential power analysis. One countermeasure against such attacks is adding a random mask to the data; this randomizes the statistics of the calculation at the cost of computing "mask corrections." The single nonlinear step in each AES round is the "S-box" (involving a Galois inversion), which incurs the majority of the cost for mask corrections. Oswald et al. [1] showed how the "tower field" representation allows maintaining an additive mask throughout the Galois inverse calculation. This work applies a similar masking strategy to the most compact (unmasked) S-box to date [2] . The result is the most compact masked S-box so far, with "perfect masking" (by the definition of Blömer[3]) giving suitable implementations immunity to first-order differential side-channel attacks.
Introduction
In 2001 the National Institute of Standards and Technology adopted the Rijndael algorithm [4] as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [5] , to provide a standard algorithm for secure encryption, intended not only for U.S. government documents, but also for electronic commerce. Since then, applications of AES have become widespread.
Many different implementations of AES have appeared, to satisfy the varying criteria of different applications. Some approaches seek to maximize throughput, e.g., [6] [7] [8] [9] ; others minimize power consumption, e.g., [10] ; and yet others minimize circuitry, e.g., [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . For the latter goal, Rijmen [16] suggested using subfield arithmetic in the crucial step of computing an inverse in the Galois Field of 256 elements. This idea was further extended by Satoh et al. [12] , using sub-subfields (the "tower field" representation of Paar [17] , also called the "composite-field" approach), along with other innovative optimizations, which resulted in the smallest AES circuit at that point. The S-box architecture of Satoh was refined somewhat by Canright [2] , mainly through carefully chosen normal bases, resulting in the most compact S-box to date.
No attacks have yet been found on the AES algorithm itself that are more effective than exhaustive key search ("brute force"), although research continues, for example, on algebraic attacks [18, 19] . But specific implementations of cryptograpy in software or hardware, e.g. in smart cards, may be vulnerable to "side-channel attacks" such as differential power analysis [20, 21] , that use statistical analysis of physical quantities such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc., to deduce information about the secret key.
One countermeasure against side-channel attacks is masking the data during calculation, through adding or multiplying by random values. All the steps in a round of AES are affine, except for the Galois field inversion substep of the S-box (SubBytes) step. For the other steps, calculation of the mask correction is linear, so an additive mask is most convenient. Some have suggested switching to a multiplicative mask for the Galois inverse step (e.g., [22] ), but one inescapable weakness is that a zero data byte is unmasked by multiplication [23] .
Applying the "tower field" representation, inversion in GF(2 8 ) involves several multiplications and one inversion in the subfield GF(2 4 ), which in turn involves multiplications and inversion in GF (2 2 ). In the sub-subfield GF(2 2 ), inversion is identical to squaring, and so is linear (over GF (2) ). Oswald et al. [1] applied this idea to additive masking of the Galois inverse, and showed how to compute the mask corrections for the tower field approach. (Morioka and Akishita [24] apparently developed a similar masking scheme.) Many of the correction terms involve multiplication in subfields, and Oswald et al. showed how some of these multiplications can be eliminated through clever re-use of parts of the input mask for the output.
The present work incorporates this masking approach into the compact S-box of Canright [2] , and also applies the optimization methods of [2] to the mask correction terms. At the level of operations in the subfield GF(2 4 ), we simplify the approach somewhat, eliminating one multiplication and some additions, with further simplifications at lower levels. Even so, we show that our approach achieves the goal of "perfect masking," in the terminology of Blömer et al. [3] : each intermediate result has a statistical distribution that is independent of the plaintext and key (assuming a source of uniformly distributed truly random masks). This level of security (a strengthened version of that in [25] ) ensures that no firstorder differential side-channel attacks can succeed, at least at the algorithmic level. (Higher-order attacks are possible, but take much greater effort.) However, Mangard et al. [26] showed that first-order DPA attacks can succeed against a masked S-box using standard CMOS technology, even when the intermediate results at the algorithmic level are provably secure. The attack exploits glitches in the gate transition timings. In later work, Mangard et al. [27] showed that the information leakage is caused by specific XOR gates in masked multipliers, and can be eliminated if those XORs are made to satisfy timing constraints, either through delay elements or by enable signals. Also, rather than CMOS, other (more expensive) logic styles can be used to eliminate this potential problem. So masked S-boxes can be made secure from first-order DPA. At any rate, the current work only considers the intermediate results at the algorithmic level, and shows that they are provably secure, which is the best that can be expected.
We apply the same optimizations as in the unmasked S-box of [2] , including efficient normal bases, elimination of common sub-expressions, and logic-gate substitutions, to the masked S-box calculation here, including mask correction terms. The result is, as far as we know, the most compact masked S-box to date (for the 0.13-µ CMOS standard cell library considered). But the cost for this security is that the S-box size is almost three times that of the unmasked S-box. Also, since the security requires certain calculations to proceed in sequence, the speed will be reduced. For applications with sufficient resources to unroll the round loop, we show how re-using masks between rounds can save a significant amount of the mask correction calculations; then the masked S-box is roughly twice the size of the unmasked. Our compact masked S-box design could be useful for securing some hardware AES applications, especially those with limited resources, against first-order differential attacks.
Algebraic description
The AES algorithm has been described thoroughly and frequently elsewhere [5] ; here we give the barest outline before concentrating on the S-box. It is a symmetric block cipher (16 bytes, though the original Rijndael cipher supports other block sizes [4] ) consisting of several rounds (10, 12, or 14, for a key size 16, 24, or 32 bytes, respectively). Each round involves the four steps called SubBytes (byte substitution, or S-box), ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey (the last round skips MixColumns, and there is a Round 0 consisting solely of AddRoundKey). The latter three steps are linear with respect to the data block, and provide "diffusion." SubBytes is the nonlinear step that provides "confusion."
The S-box, applied to each byte, consists of two substeps: (i) considering the byte an element of the Galois field GF(2 8 ), find its inverse in that field (except a zero byte, which has no inverse, remains unchanged); (ii) considering the resulting byte a vector of bits in (GF (2)) 8 , multiply by a given bit matrix and add a given constant vector, i.e., an affine transformation.
In the particular Galois field of AES, a byte represents a polynomial where the bits are coefficients of corresponding powers of x, and multiplication is modulo the irreducible polynomial q(x) = x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1. Equivalently, one could consider a root, say θ, of this polynomial, so q(θ) = 0 in this field; then the bits of a byte would correspond to coefficients of powers of θ, e.g., 2 = θ, 3 = θ + 1, 4 = θ 2 , etc. Thus the bits form a vector with respect to what is called a polynomial basis. But there are computational advantages to considering a different (though isomorphic) representation of GF (2 8 ). Instead of a vector of dimension eight over GF (2) , we consider a byte as a vector of dimension two over GF (2 4 ), where each 4-bit element is in turn a vector of dimension two over GF(2 2 ), and finally each 2-bit element is a vector of dimension two over GF (2) . This has been called a composite field, or "tower field" representation [17] . In this way, the 8-bit inverse calculation comprises several 4-bit operations, each consisting of various simple 2-bit calculations. For each of these subfields, it has been shown [2] that a normal basis (consisting of a conjugate pair) is more efficient than a polynomial basis for the required inverse calculation; for each particular basis used, the trace (sum of the conjugate pair) is 1, and the norm (product of the conjugate pair) is a nonzero element of the subfield [2] .
Converting between the standard AES representation and the composite field representation amounts to a change of basis, accomplished by multiplying the bit vector by a bit matrix. In converting back, this bit matrix can be combined with that of the affine transformation substep [12] . With regard to an additive mask, these matrix multiplications are simple linear calculations for the mask correction terms. Below we detail the mask corrections required for the nonlinear inverse calculation.
Inversion without masking
Here we employ the following convention: upper-case bold symbols represent elements of the main field (e.g. A ∈ GF(2 8 )); upper-case italic symbols are for elements of the subfield (e.g. A ∈ GF(2 4 )); lower-case bold is used for the subsubfield (e.g. a ∈ GF(2 2 )); and lower-case italic is for single bits (e.g. a ∈ GF (2) 
, is given by [2] :
(Note that ⊗ and ⊕ denote multiplication and addition calculations in a Galois field, while A 1 Y 16 + A 0 Y is just the algebraic expression for the vector [A 1 , A 0 ] in the normal basis.) This requires inversion, multiplication, and the combined "square-scale" operation (N⊗X 2 ) in the subfield GF(2 4 ). Similarly, the inversion in GF(2 4 )/GF(2 2 ) using a normal basis [Z 4 , Z], where Z and Z 4 are the roots of X 2 + X + n and n ∈ GF(2 2 ) is the norm (n = Z 5 ), is given by:
But in the sub-subfield GF(2 2 ), inversion is the same as squaring, equivalent to a bit swap:
where w and w 2 are the roots of x 2 +x+1. (While this algebraic description uses the Galois inverse, the case of a zero element in any of these fields is correctly handled: the zero element is returned in lieu of an inverse.)
Masked Inversion
Now introduce additive masking. By adding a random mask, such that the statistical distribution of masks is uniform over the field, now our operands appear random as well, uncorrelated to either plaintext or key. Hence the statistical data available through side channels appears as noise, independent of the chosen sets of plaintexts, and the key is protected against first-order differential attacks. The cost is the computation of mask correction terms that are combined with the given masked input to correctly mask the output. Here we outline the algebraic steps involved; we later show that this masking scheme is secure in 2.5.
We use the insight of Oswald et al. that in the sub-subfield GF(2 2 ) inversion (squaring) is additive, so for data a and mask m, then
and finding the mask correction m 2 is trivial. Hence the tower-field approach eliminates the need to remove the additive mask (or change it to a multiplicative one) before inversion.
In the larger fields, here is how the mask corrections can be calculated. We indicate the masked version of the input byte A with a tilde:Ã, and similarly for the other masked quantities. So the input to the masked GF (2 8 ) inverter is the data byte A already masked by the (known) mask M
with the resultB being B above, masked by M 2 , which is uniformly distributed.
Here the terms must be added in sequence to keep each intermediate result uniformly distributed, as discussed below in 2.5. 2 (which need not be computed, only its square m 2 below).
In the sub-subfield, sayc =c 1 w 2 +c 0 w, and let
soc −1 is c −1 above masked by another uniform mask m 2 . The next steps would involve only multiplications, but directly adding any of the correction terms would reveal a distribution that depends on the data. Hence (as in Oswald et al. [1] ) we need to introduce another additive mask. This mask could be new, or could be re-used bits from the original mask M. In either case, this mask must be added first, then the other mask correction terms added individually to the sum, to maintain the uniform distribution for intermediate results.
Say now we introduce a new temporary 4-bit mask T = t 1 Z 4 + t 0 Z, and let
so that the resultB
0 Z is B −1 above, masked by T (but is not the inverse ofB).
Similarly, introduce a new 8-bit mask S = S 1 Y 16 + S 0 Y for the output, and letÃ
so that the resultÃ
0 Y is the answer A −1 above, masked by the output mask S:
Re-using Masks
Oswald et al. [1] showed that through using parts of the input mask for the intermediate results and the output, then several operations can be eliminated, notably multiplications (for the cost of a few additions). We will follow the same strategy below. (While re-using masks could make the implementation more vulnerable to higher-order differential side-channel analysis, it remains secure against first-order attacks.)
The first place where re-using masks helps is in the masked intermediate resultc −1 , where for one subsequent calculation the mask m 1 would be helpful but for another the preferred mask would be m 0 , so we follow [1] and switch masks. Then starting at (15) above we modify the calculation as follows:
where the underlined products had already been computed previously and may be re-used. (Parens indicate the order of evaluation necessary to avoid unmasking operands. In the actual optimized code, the details of the specific bits added are different.) The resultB
0 Z is still B −1 above, but now masked by M 1 = m 11 Z 4 + m 10 Z, the upper half of the input mask. Following the same approach of switching masks at the next level gives
again allowing the underlined products to be re-used, and with the outputÃ
0 Y having the output mask S (which could be the original input mask M, or not):
Re-using Masks between Rounds
Many of the mask correction terms used in the masked inversion above involve only the input mask, independent of the masked data. This is also true of all the mask correction term calculations in the other steps of each round of encryption, as those other steps are all linear (with respect to the additive mask). Then, if the original 128-bit mask for a block of data were to be re-used for every round, all those data-independent correction terms would be the same for each round. For implementations where the round loop is "unrolled," with S-boxes for each round, these terms would only need computing once, then could be passed along to all the other rounds. This would save the re-computation of all those mask terms, eliminating the associated circuitry, at the modest cost of the "wiring" required to pass along the correction terms. Of course, one would use a new random mask with each new block of data in Round 0, to ensure that over time the distribution of masks remains uniform. More precisely, one way to do this starts by picking a random 128-bit mask that will be used as the output mask (whose bytes correspond to S above) from the inversion step. Then after each byte undergoes the basis change (from the tower field form) combined with affine transformation part of the S-box (excluding the additive constant), the ShiftRows step is applied to the whole mask; the result is the output mask after the last round of encryption (which lacks the MixColumns step). Then MixColumns is applied to that, giving the input mask to be added to the initial data before Round 0. Applying byte-wise the basis change (to the tower field form) gives the input mask (corresponding to M above) for the inversion step. From this can be computed such terms as M 1 ⊗ M 0 , M 2 , m 1 ⊗ m 0 , and m 2 above, to be re-used each round. Then the only correction terms that would need computing in each round are the datadependent terms (e.g.Ã 1 ⊗M 0 above) of the inversion step.
But this only makes sense if the application has enough room to unroll (at least partly) the round loop. (While unrolling the rounds does not improve latency, this saving of correction terms may make unrolling preferable to simply duplicating more encryptors for increased throughput.) In cases where compactness is paramount the same few S-boxes would be employed for each round; using pre-computed correction terms from round to round would then require extra registers -a cost rather than a saving.
Security of Masked Operands
Here we show that the masked inversion operation outlined above is secure, by which we mean, assuming a source of truly random uniformly distributed masks, then the distribution of each intermediate result is independent of both the plaintext data and the key. This gives "perfect masking" in the terminology of [3] , and hence protection from first-order differential side-channel attacks. We start with Lemmas 1 and 2 of [3] (paraphrased) and, to be thorough, add two more lemmas to cover all the operations in inversion, which are then examined in detail.
Lemma 1. Given x uniformly distributed over a finite field IF, and any y ∈ IF
independent of x, then z = x ⊕ y is also uniformly distributed and independent of y. [3] Lemma 2. Given x and y independent and both uniformly distributed over a finite field GF(p n ), then z = x ⊗ y is distributed according to
here called the random product distribution. [3] Lemma 3. Given x uniformly distributed over a finite set IF, and a one-to-one mapping f : IF → IF, then y = f (x) is also uniformly distributed.
Proof: For a finite set, any one-to-one mapping is a bijection, i.e., just a permutation of the elements, so a uniform distribution is unchanged. (Note in particular that any isomorphism of a finite field is a bijection.)
of ordered 2n-tuples from a finite set IF, then the two halves
] of x are independent and uniformly distributed over IF n .
Proof: Since x is uniform if and only if each x i is independently uniform over IF, then y 1 and y 2 are independent and uniform. (So given a uniform mask of n bits then any sub-mask is also uniform.) Consider the operations in the masked inversion above. Initially adding a uniform mask to the plaintext data gives a uniform result, as isÃ in (10) above, with independent uniform halvesÃ 1 ,Ã 0 . ThenÃ 1 ⊕Ã 0 is uniform, so is its square (squaring is an isomorphism in a field of characteristic 2), and so is that square scaled by the norm N , since multiplication by a nonzero constant is a one-to-one mapping. Each of the other four products in (12) forB has the random product distribution.
Now the order of adding these pieces together is crucial, because adding any pair of those four products would give a distribution that depends on the data. So the uniform N⊗ Ã 1 ⊕Ã 0 2 must be added to the first product before any other products are added; by successively adding each other product to the previous uniform sum, then each resulting sum is uniform, includingB. Also, its mask
Similar reasoning applies toc in (14) . Then its square in (22) is also uniform, with the uniform mask m 2 = n 2 ⊗ (m 1 ⊕ m 0 ); hence the order of summation forc −1 in (22) is important to avoid unmasking by (c) 2 ⊕ m 2 . Again, in (23) forb
1 , each of the four products has the random product distribution, and the first sum must be with the uniform mask m 11 , then each other product added successively, so each result is uniform. And again, in switching masks forc −1 2 in (24) the order of summation for is important to prevent unmasking byc −1 ⊕m 1 . All the remaining steps are similar to those already discussed.
Therefore, the result of every calculation is either uniformly distributed or has the random product distribution (provided the summations are performed in the correct order), independent of the data and key: "perfect masking." This protects suitable implementations from attacks by first-order differential sidechannel analysis. (Resistance against higher-order attacks would be improved by avoiding re-use of masks within the S-box, as well as between rounds.)
Optimizations and Results
The algebraic description above shows the most efficient masked inversion at that algebraic, hierarchical level. At the bit level, further optimization is possible due to certain bit combinations being useful in more than one place. And at the logic gate level, certain substitutions of types of logic gates give further savings in circuit size (for the standard cell library considered).
Here we briefly describe the main optimizations, which are essentially the same as in [2] , but applied also to mask correction calculations. Each Galois multiplier involves bit sums, and since all factors are shared between two multipliers (using normal bases), these bit sums can be re-used; some of them are also useful as parts of the square-scale operation. And bit sums required for mask switching in (27) are useful in subfield operations also. Gate-level optimizations (minimizing the size for the 0.13-µ CMOS standard cell library [28] considered) include replacing AND by NAND, and where possible, replacing a NAND and some XORs by a single NOR. (We only consider two-input logic gates; using gates with more inputs may allow some improvement.)
But the S-box involves more than inversion in the tower-field representation. The affine transformation and conversion to/from the tower-field form are also required. (While one approach is to use the tower-field form for the entire encryption round [11] , we use it only for the inversion, so that the MixColumns step remains simple.) For decryption, the inverse affine transformation is required. The conversion between the standard form and the tower-field form can be done through multiplying the byte by a bit matrix, and one of those two matrices can be combined with the bit matrix multiply of the affine transformation (or inverse). Satoh et al. [12] showed how, when both encryption and decryption are required, an architecture sharing a single Galois inverter between an S-box and an inverse S-box allows some further optimization in the four matrices involved. We use the particular normal bases of [2] and the corresponding optimally factored matrices to minimize this computation.
We wrote a complete implementation, with all optimizations, of the masked S-box and inverse S-box using the merged architecture of [12] , with a shared Galois inverter. The complete implementation, written in Verilog, is given in [29] . Here both the input mask and the output mask are parameters, along with the masked data byte. The code has been compiled and run on an FPGA, and shown to give correct results for every combination of encryption/decryption, data byte, input mask, and output mask (33,554,432 combinations). Tables 1 and 2 give the resulting numbers of logic gates separately for the masked Galois inverter and the basis change (bit matrices). Results are shown by number and type of specific logic operations, and also by total "gates," where the number refers to the equivalent number of NAND gates (rounded to whole numbers), using our standard cell library. We use the equivalencies 1 XOR/XNOR = Note that the additional resources needed to use different masks on input and output are significant for the merged architecture, but not for dedicated encryption (or decryption) only. For protection against first-order differential attacks, there is no reason not to use the input mask for the output as well. In this case, the size for the merged architecture where encryption and decryption share an inverter is 640 NAND equivalents, nearly three times the size of the unmasked version (234 gates). (For encryption only, not merged, the S-box with a single mask for both input and output is 557 NAND equivalents, compared with 180 for unmasked; again masked is three times larger.)
However, if the current approach were used in an application where the loop of rounds was "unrolled" (requiring enough room for at least 160 S-boxes for com- Table 2 . Basis Change Sizes. Here we compare gates needed in the basis change bit matrices (including the affine transformation but excluding the Galois inverter) for a merged S-box & inverse, S-box alone, and inverse S-box alone, using different input and output masks, same mask for both, or no mask. Both individual gate counts and NAND equivalents are given. plete unrolling), the masks could be re-used from round to round, as discussed above in 2.4. This would require passing along the extra bits of pre-computed corrections between rounds. For one S-box, the total number of mask-term bits would be 43, as compared to 8 bits for an input mask alone (to be used as output mask also, or 16 bits for two different masks). These extra wires would replace 33 XORs and 12 NANDs in the inverter, and all of the mask basis change calculation (so the basis change would be as if unmasked). The gains from this re-use between rounds is shown in Table 3 ; then a masked merged S-box is 506 NAND equivalents, rather than the 640 above. In addition to this saving per S-box (after the first round), the MixColumns operation on the mask block would also be eliminated (again, after the first round). Table 4 , augmented to compare with the present work. They compare their approach (MS-IAIK) to their implementations of two previous methods, and do not include addition and inversion operations, presumably because addition is relatively small (4 XORs) and one subfield inversion is assumed. The column for multipliers in GF (2 4 ) is the most significant (since each GF(2 4 ) multiplier includes 3 multipliers and 4 additions in GF(2 2 )) and our approach saves one multiplier at this level. It is not clear how they implemented squaring, and multiplication by a constant, called "scaling" here; in our approach with normal bases, squaring is always followed with scaling by the norm, so we treat square-scale as a single operation, which we have optimized down to only 3 XORs, less than one of the 4-bit additions that are not counted in [1] .
Basis
Some rough comparison is possible in the algebraic description at the GF(2 4 ) level: our (12) and (13) are approximately comparable to their (19) , while our (26) , (28) are like their (15) , (17) respectively. In particular, their (19) (which includes 4 squares, though only 2 appear in [1, Table 1 ]) shows more terms than our combined (12, 13) . So we save at least some GF(2 4 ) additions, and again at the GF(2 2 ) level. But while detailed comparison is difficult in the lack of specifics, we are confident that ours is the smallest masked S-box to date, because it uses the same optimizations as the smallest unmasked S-box to date.
Conclusion
Side-channel attacks can be an major concern for certain applications of AES, including hardware applications with limited resources, such as smart cards. Adding random masks can be an effective countermeasure, though at the cost of computing mask corrections in the S-box (the rest of each round being linear). Here we show how to compute the Galois inverse (the nonlinear part of the Sbox) with "perfect masking," in that the distributions of all the masked operands are independent of the chosen plaintext and key; hence suitable implementations employing this method are secure against first-order differential side-channel attacks. (Though, as discussed in the Introduction, CMOS implementations might be vulnerable to DPA attacks, due to glitches [26] , unless specific timing constraints are met [27] .) While our approach is similar to [1] , we have reduced the number of operations at every level. We have optimized this masked S-box for minimal chip area, giving the smallest masked S-box of which we are aware.
The overhead for masking nearly triples the size of the S-box, from 234 gates (NAND equivalents) to 640 gates for the merged version. In applications with sufficient resources to unroll the round loop (where the compactness of our Sbox allows more copies for a given area), this overhead may be reduced through re-using the block mask between rounds. Then (after the first round) each S-box would require only 506 gates, a little over twice the size of the unmasked version, and the mask correction for the rest of each round would also be eliminated.
